Le 1st New York Volunteer Engineer Regiment est un régiment de génie qui a servi dans l' armé de l'Union pendant la guerre de Sécession. Il est aussi connu comme les Ingénieurs de Serrell [ 1 ]le corps des ingénieurs volontaires de New York ou les ingénieur et artisans.

Le régiment sert d'abord sur le théâtre du bas littoralet plus tard lors de la campagne de Richmond—Petersburg. Enle corps des ingénieurs se compose de seulement 44 officiers et soldats pour une armée de soldats.

Après la formation de la Confédération et la bataille de Fort Sumterle congrès autorise une augmentation massive du nombre de troupes d'ingénieurs spécialisés, le 3 aoûtpour compléter l'armée de l'Union grossissante [ 2 ]. Edward W. Serrellun ingénieur en génie civil célèbre obtient l'autorisation de commencer à recruter un régiment du génie qui va devenir connu comme le 1st New York Volunteer Engineer Regiment, ou régiment de Serrell [ 3 ].

Le régiment est accepté par l'État le 27 septembre Serrell est nommé lieutenant-colonel des volontaires le 11 octobreet promu colonel en décembre de cette année. Le régiment est officiellement organisé dans la ville de New Yorket entre en service pour trois ans le 11 octobre Lors de la formation, on promet aux ingénieurs volontaires une solde d'un tiers supérieure à celle de la ligne. Après l'entrée en service de l'unité, le commissaire général refuse de reconnaître le statut du régiment nouvellement formé, et les payent au même taux que l'infanterie.

À la suite de l'échec des protestations auprès du département de la guerre pour rectifier la situation, les hommes refusent de recevoir leur rémunération réduite. Enfin, après avoir refusé pendant huit mois d'accepter la solde réduite, l'ordre arrive finalement pour augmenter la solde des soldats au montant convenu [ 5 ].

Le régiment se distingue lors la bataille de fort Pulaskien aidant à capturer le fort après 30 heures de bombardementconstruisant des batteries pour le nouveau canon rayé James [ 6 ]. Le 1st New York reçoit l'honneur d'avoir son drapeau régimentaire choisit comme le premier drapeau à flotter au-dessus du fort Pulaski après sa capture.

Le régiment est employé tout au long de la côte est, de la Caroline du Sud à la Floride. Pendant qu'il sert dans le Xe corpsle régiment participe à la capture de plusieurs forts clés dans le port de Charleston.

Après l'échec de l'assaut d'infanterie contre le fort Wagner qui comprend la célèbre charge du 54th Massachusetts Infantryracontée dans l'apogée du film Gloryle 1st New York Engineers est chargé de réaliser un siège traditionnel contre le fort. Après 60 jours de bombardements, les défenseurs abandonnent le fort le 7 septembre Utilisant Morris Island comme une zone de transit, le Xe corps peut se concentrer sur la reprise du fort Sumterle site de la première action militaire de la guerre de Sécession.

Au cours de la seconde bataille de fort Sumterle 1st New York Engineers crée des tours de guet et construit des batteries dans une tentative pour venir à bout du fort par capitulation.

Cependant, en dépit d'un bombardement quasi constant, ainsi que l'échec d'un assaut amphibie, les forces de l'Union sont incapables d'occuper le fort jusqu'à son abandon par les forces confédérées le 17 février [ 7 ]. Incapable de reprendre le fort Sumter, le Xe corps sous les ordres du général Quincy Adams Gillmore tourne son attention vers la ville proche de Charleston. Gillmore veut bombarder Charleston à l'aide de feu grégeois pour la forcer à la capitulation sans capturer les forts du port, de sorte qu'il ordonne Serrell d'explorer les possibilités de construire une batterie dans le marais entre James Island et Morris Island [ 8 ].

Selon la légende, Serrell donne travail à un jeune ingénieur qui déclare que le projet ne peut pas être fait. Serrell dit à l'ingénieur sceptique que rien n'est impossible, et de réquisitionner tous les matériaux nécessaires. Un peu plus tard, Serrell reçoit une demande pour une vingtaine d'hommes de dix-huit pieds 5,4 mètres de haut.

Dans le même temps, il y a une demande au chirurgien du département de coller trois hommes de six pieds pour faire les dix-huit pieds nécessaires.

La demande n'a pas amusé Serrell, et il remplace rapidement le jeune officier [ 9 ]. Serrell assume la responsabilité personnelle et mène une série d'expériences pour établir la capacité du sol à supporter le poids. The War of ended on favorable terms for the United States, but it spawned a hundred-year long debate within the nation concerning the efficacy of a large-standing peacetime regular army versus the traditional militia-based citizen's army.

American soldiers fighting in the Mexican War from would be the first American soldiers systematically organized into combat divisions. These divisions proved to be the type of self-supporting tactical organizations that the Army needed to fight the campaigns of the Mexican War which were fought over long distances, in rugged terrain, and under harsh climatic conditions.

Army divisions proved their worth as units of tactical maneuver. Although the division proved to be an effective tactical innovation during the Mexican War, the Army found that it was difficult to identify officers who were capable of leading a sophisticated combat formation as large as a division.

Most division commanders were appointed because of Regular Army seniority or political connections. The strength of the American Army in Mexico centered around its young officers, especially graduates of West Point, and its enlisted soldiers. The army proved that small cadres of officers and non-commissioned officers who knew how to soldier could make efficient soldiers out of volunteers in short order. At the close of the Mexican War, brigades and divisions were quickly disbanded because they were viewed by the War Department as temporary wartime tactical organizations that the government could ill afford in peacetime.

The small Regular Army returned to regimental garrison duty at camps and forts around the United States and along the frontier. For administrative purposes, the War Department divided the country into large territorial departments to which the regiments would be assigned. These military departments persisted throughout the Civil War and existed simultaneously with the tactical armies, corps, and divisions that operated within their borders.

This perplexing system created an unwanted administrative burden to tactical field commanders who were also appointed commanders of the military departments. The organization and administrative operation of the U.

Army from to was based on a one-volume set of periodically revised 'General Regulations' issued by the War Department. While the majority of the pages of this document are consumed with the vast administrative details of running an army, Article XXXVI, entitled Troops in Campaign specifies that "the formation by divisions is the basis of the organization and administration of armies in the field.

During the course of the war, brigades usually consisted of from two to six regiments and divisions were formed with two or more brigades.

The most common alignment during the war was five regiments to a brigade and three brigades to a division. While the division would remain an important tactical organization throughout the war, by it would be eclipsed as the basic larger unit formation of the army by the army corps made up of two or more divisions.

As early as July 19, a War Department order contained language about the formation of "Corps d'Armee" on the French model. Late inPresident Lincoln recommended to General McClellan that the fifteen divisions of the ponderous Army of the Potomac would operate better if organized into army corps.

While Lincoln ordered McClellan to organize army corps in MarchCongress did not authorize the President to form army corps at his discretion until July 17, McClellan demurred over the formation of army corps because he felt that there were no officers who had proven themselves as corps commander material.

It would also prove difficult to find officers who could handle both the administrative and combat duties associated with a large division. The U. Army combat division of today has much in common with the Civil War division of The modern division "consists of a relatively fixed command, staff combat support, and combat service support structure to which maneuver battalions are assigned. Artillery support for infantry divisions varied between the Union and Confederate armies.

At Gettysburg each Confederate division had an organic artillery battalion, while Union divisions were allocated artillery support as needed from their corps artillery brigades or the army artillery reserve. The command group of the Civil War division consisted of the division commander and his personal staff, normally a variable number of commissioned officer Aides-de-camp ADCs. The division commander was assigned to his duties by the general commanding-in-chief of the army or directly by the War Department.

In a time when the speed of communications on the battlefield was only as fast as a horse, the ADCs performed the critical function of receiving and distributing the commanding general's orders to the brigade commanders or delivering messages to adjacent or higher headquarters.

The evolution of the Civil War division staff began during the American Revolution when Washington organized administrative and logistical staffs for the Continental Army based on British precedents. In the War Department sent a Commission of officers to observe the European armies, then engaged in fighting the Crimean War. The Commission produced voluminous reports on their observations of the organization and war fighting techniques of the British, French, and Russian armies.

The individual reports of Maj. Alfred Mordecai, Ordnance Corps, and Capt. George B. McClellan, Corps of Engineers, contained detailed descriptions of the type of military staffs used by these armies. Subsequent development of military staffs in Civil War field armies can be linked to the observations of the European Commission. During the Civil War, the maintenance and business management of the U. Army came from the various bureaus of the War Department.

Since there could be only one chief of a bureau for the entire War Department, all officers serving similar functions on the military staffs of the field armies, corps, divisions, and brigades throughout the Army used the title "Assistant" in front of their job title. This technical channel of staff hierarchy gave the field staff officer a link with his bureau in the War Department. The Army was a bureaucracy that required tons of paper reports to make it function.

Feeding this paper mill were the field staff officers who were required by the General Regulations of to submit countless forms, returns, reports and requisitions to administer and maintain their units. For instance, a brigade assistant adjutant general AAG would submit monthly strength returns reports through the division and corps AAG where they were consolidated by the army AAG for submission to the War Department.

The combat efficiency of the division could be measured by the quality of the division staff. Perhaps the greatest challenge to a Civil War division commander was to train and nurture his staff so that it could perform well during combat conditions. By virtue of the solid combat performance of the Second Division, Third Army Corps of the Army of the Potomac at Gettysburg, it is apparent that Brigadier General BG Andrew Atkinson Humphreys, the division commander, understood the importance of a well-trained and motivated battle staff.

At Gettysburg his staff would serve him well during some of the most ferocious fighting encountered by an infantry division during the course of the war. Finding officers capable of training battle staffs and maneuvering infantry divisions on the battlefield proved difficult for Civil War armies simply because no pool of large unit leaders existed at the outset of hostilities.

Humphreys' rise to divisional command was typical of many Regular and Volunteer officers swept up in the rapid expansion of the Army. A Captain in the pre-war Regular Army, Humphreys ascended to command of an infantry division without the benefit of even regimental command experience and without Mexican War combat experience. In spite of rapid wartime promotions, however, the road to divisional command for many Regular officers was very long.

Humphreys commanded his first division in combat after twenty-nine years service in the Regular Army. Born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on November 2,Humphreys was fifty-two years old at the time of the Gettysburg Campaign.

His father, Samuel, and grandfather, Joshua, were both naval architects and ship builders. His grandfather drew the plans for the frigate Constitution, better known as Old Ironsides. Report upon the Physics and Hydraulics of the Mississippi. Co-authored with Henry L. War Department, Corps of Topographical Engineers, The Pennsylvania Campaign of Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, Humphreys reentered the Army two years later in and was commissioned as a First Lieutenant in the Corps of Topographical Engineers.

After this realignment, the larger Corps of Engineers would concentrate on providing combat support to the field armies and in building coastal fortifications. Andrew Humphreys' duties as a "topog" at the War Department kept him out of the Mexican War and denied him important combat experience.

Between and he attained prominence as a Civil Engineer when he was placed in charge of the topographic and hydrographic survey of the delta of the Mississippi.

Henry L. Abbot in by the War Department resulted in world-wide acclaim for his Civil Engineering accomplishments. Observing that Humphreys had the technical expertise and leadership potential to command a large combat unit, McClellan supported Humphreys' promotion to Brigadier General of U. Volunteers dating from April 28, Humphreys first experience as a division commander would be frustrating.

With the battle of Antietam imminent he assumed command of his division on September 12,at Alexandria, Virginia. The two infantry brigades constituting his division were made up of untrained rookie soldiers from Pennsylvania. Seven of the eight infantry regiments in the division had entered Federal service during the first week of August and half of them were equipped with Austrian rifles that were inoperative. Humphreys drove these troops on a long and rugged road march to join the Army of the Potomac arriving at Frederick, Maryland, September On September 17, Humphreys received orders to join the Army by P.

Notifying General McClellan that his division would march all night, but would arrive fit for combat, Humphreys lived up to his promise. After a difficult all night twenty-three mile march, his division, missing only of 6, soldiers to straggling, was ready for combat as part of the Army's reserve by A.

Humphreys was outraged by McClellan's initial battle report because the report stated that Humphreys Division of rookie soldiers arrived unfit for combat. Humphreys request for a War Department court of inquiry to clear his reputation forced McClellan to amend his first report accordingly. Humphreys received a bloody baptism of fire on December 13,at the battle of Fredericksburg for at P.

Colonel Allabach having been directed to form his brigade in two lines, General Humphreys rode out into the field to observe the ground more closely. As he did so, Colonel Barnes, commanding the First Brigade of General Griffin's division, walked over from beyond the left of our line and met him.

Infantry of the Mexican war, rode through his command with his staff as the formation was being completed, and had the muskets 'rung' to prove them all unloaded, then, with the brigade formed, the front line at 'charge bayonets' and the second line at 'right shoulder arms,' he reported his command ready to move forward. As the bugle sounded the charge, General Humphreys turned to his staff and bowing with uncovered head, remarked as quietly and pleasantly as it inviting them to be seated around his table; 'Gentlemen, I shall lead this charge; I presume of course, you will wish to ride with me.

Despite his personal bravery, both of Humphreys' brigades quickly gave way when exposed to the full force of the Confederate fire and sustained losses that included 1, killed, wounded, and captured soldiers, slightly less than fifty percent of the division. At the battle of Chancellorsville in early MayMeade's Fifth Corps, to which Humphreys Division was assigned, was used sparingly. Humphreys main action came at the end of the battle as the Fifth Corps was ordered to cover the withdrawal of Hooker's defeated army back across the Rappahannock River.

Fortune smiled on Humphreys Division at Chancellorsville, however, because it sustained only casualties 22 killed, wounded, and 55 missing. Berry who had been killed-in-action at Chancellorsville. He entered the Gettysburg Campaign commanding his second division of the war. What sort of man was Andrew A. Humphreys at the onset of the Gettysburg Campaign? Physically he closely resembled his grandfather, Joshua Humphreys, who was described as being. His bones were those of a man of six feet.

His head was large, beautifully shaped, surmounted in his old age by a thick mane of curling gray hair. His eyes were steel gray in color, large and open, and exceedingly piercing; his mouth large, well-shaped and firm; nose, large and of Grecian form All these features are clearly visible in the June photograph of a newly-minted General Humphreys shown in Figure 2.

Positive and negative insights into Humphreys personality were recorded by a number of observers. Abbot, Humphreys' pre-war Civil Engineering colleague, wrote that "General Humphreys exerted a personal magnetism which can hardly be expressed in words. His manners were marked by all the graceful courtesy of the old school, while the unaffected simplicity and modesty of his character, and the force and vigor of his ideas, left an impression not easily effaced.

Theodore Lyman, a Volunteer ADC for Meade, observed that "he [Humphreys] is a an extremely neat man, and is continually washing huile damande douce contre la cellulite and putting on paper dickeys.

He has a great deal of knowledge, beyond his profession, and is an extremely gentlemanly man. When he does get wrathy, he sets his teeth and lets go a torrent of adjectives that must rather astonish those not used to little outbursts. Gen David Bell Birney who secretly confided to a friend that "Humphreys Humphreys possessed a keen intellect and extraordinary soldiering skills.

More importantly, Humphreys was a "fighter," a trait which Dana found rather exceptional for an engineer. He, like thousands of Volunteer officers, probably learned the mechanics of maneuvering troops in battle by judiciously studying the popular tactical handbooks of the day such as Hardee's Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics or Brig.

Gen Silas Casey's Infantry Tactics ; by subjecting his division to monotonous battle drills; and, most importantly, by experiencing the crucible of combat. There are differing views of Humphreys as a military leader. Henry Abbot provides the following insights into Humphreys military leadership style. In official relations General Humphreys was dignified, self-possessed and courteous.

His decisions were based on full consideration of the subject and, once rendered, were final. He had a profound contempt for every thing which resembled double-dealing or cowardice. He scorned the arts of time servers and demagogues; and when confronted with meanness, took no pains to conceal his indignation no matter what might be the rank or position of the offender. He felt the warmest personal interest in the success of his young associates, and often did acts of kindness of which they learned the results but not the source.

Conversely, Harry Pfanz, noted Civil War historian, concluded that Humphreys "had little charisma and was not a popular commander" and that he earned the sobriquet of "Old Goggle Eyes" because he wore spectacles and was a strict disciplinarian. Humphreys left a splendid official report describing his actions during the battle.

1st new york regiment civil war

Of all the battle reports written during the war, Humphreys Gettysburg report is a model of clarity and completeness. In the report Humphreys made a great effort to officially recognize the key combat leaders of the division and all of his divisional staff officers. Recognizing the unique quality of the report, the editor of The Historical Magazine first published it in Humphreys was nonplussed about the notoriety of the report because in a letter which accompanied the article he stated.

A battle so lifts a man out of himself that he scarcely recognizes his identity when peace returns, and with it quiet occupation. Despite Humphreys later reservations, his Gettysburg report with its first-hand impressions of the battle provides a clear picture of a Civil War division in action.

Twenty years later, inHumphreys' report was again published as part of the War Department's official compilation of Civil War records. Humphreys Division entered the campaign as the second of two divisions that constituted the Third Army Corps commanded by Maj.

Daniel Sickles. Humphreys had little direct contact with his new corps commander during the early stages of the campaign because Sickles was on leave in New York City recovering from the effects of a minor wound from Chancellorsville, [ 50 ] By virtue of seniority General Birney, the First Division Commander, was "acting" corps commander during much of the approach march.

The absence of the corps commander and the rapid movement of the Army of the Potomac into Pennsylvania provided Humphreys little opportunity to observe the charismatic Dan Sickles in command. Humphreys was an outsider in the Third Corps simply because he was a career officer. Volunteer officers like Sickles and Birney were known to have ridiculed the fighting abilities of West Point trained regulars like Humphreys. Conceivably, Sickles and Birney were even intimidated by Humphreys intellectual skills and his reputation as a disciplinarian.

When Humphreys' Division left its camp at Falmouth, Virginia, on June 11,it was organized into three maneuver brigades. The First Brigade, commanded by Brig. Joseph B.

William R. The Third Brigade, commanded by Col. George C. Even Humphreys, the strict disciplinarian, found it difficult to keep his division intact on the approach march.

Assisting Humphreys in managing the division and controlling it in combat was his general staff. The division staff also performed critical logistical functions. An organizational chart of Humphreys' staff during the Gettysburg Campaign is shown on page In battle the division commander relied heavily on his ADCs to transmit and deliver orders to subordinate commanders and to perform tactical trouble shooting as required.

ADC duty was especially hazardous as mounted officers made lucrative targets for enemy marksmen. While the ADC had no command authority, he was the personal representative of the division commander. Orders given through an ADC had to be followed as if the order was given by the division commander himself.

The photograph shown on page was taken in September and shows General Humphreys posing with three of the four young ADCs who served him at Gettysburg. At Falmouth, Virginia, on June 11,Humphreys' Division began a series of long, hot forced marches as the Army of the Potomac raced for a showdown with Lee's army.

As his division passed through Frederick, Maryland, on June 28, Humphreys was summoned to army headquarters for an interview with the new army commander, General Meade. Meade, who had relieved Maj. Joseph Hooker of command of the army that very same day, wanted Humphreys to be his Chief-of-Staff. Humphreys declined the post and rides valley fair Meade he could be of greater service in command of his division during the impending battle.

Leading elements of Meade's Army of the Potomac and Lee's Army of Northern Virginia collided earlier that morning a few miles north of the Pennsylvania border at Gettysburg and by late afternoon a full-blown battle was raging. Humphreys halted the division one mile north of Emmitsburg at about A. Shortly thereafter, Humphreys received orders through Third Corps directly from General Meade to perform a reconnaissance of the ground north of Emmitsburg.

Meade was using Humphreys' topographical engineering experience to explore optional battle lines for the army because he had not yet decided to fully concentrate the army at Gettysburg. Humphreys left the division under the temporary command of General Carr, First Brigade, and accompanied by his Capt. Cavada, proceeded to examine the ground north of Emmitsburg.

At about P. To expedite rapid movement of the Third Corps, Birney's Division marched north on the main road from Emmitsburg while Humphreys' Division was directed to a country wagon road angling off to the northwest of the Emmitsburg Road.

Humphreys finished his reconnaissance mission and, according to Cavada, "with some difficulty the Genl. Along the way, Humphreys received some combat intelligence and more orders from the Third Corps. He saw a copy of a dispatch from General Howard that warned Sickles to guard his left from the enemy as he approached Gettysburg. He was also told by a local citizen that there were no Union troops west of the Emmitsburg Road only partially true considering the location of Buford's Cavalry Division.

Finally, a Third Corps staff officer arrived with orders directing Humphreys to "take position on the left of Gettysburg as he came up. At a fork in the road short of Marsh Creek, Hayden insisted the division take the left fork. Reluctantly, Humphreys ordered the brigade's columns to close up but to move on quietly in the darkness of the evening. After crossing and recrossing Marsh Creek a number of times, the column turned onto the Fairfield Road about three miles west of Gettysburg.

After proceeding about a mile, Hayden who was yards in advance of the column with the guides, rode back to Humphreys and informed him that there were enemy pickets directly ahead on the Fairfield Road.

Given Humphreys' penchant for use of invective language, it is interesting to ponder his first words to Hayden in response to this startling news. Alas, the historical record provides no clue. Humphreys later recorded that "before reaching the Tavern that night, I enquired as to the character of the keeper, and learned that his sympathies were not with us, or not very strongly, at least; and I therefore relied on what a young man, by the name of Boling, a wounded Union soldier, home on leave, who was there, told me of the enemy.

InHumphreys visited Mr. Bream, the tavern owner, and later wrote that. Bream says my troops made a great noise coming up, talking, etc. Now this is not true; and I told him so. I knew I was coming upon the enemy, and gave the caution to be quiet. What he heard was the noise of horses, and artillery, and ambulances, crossing and wading up Marsh run or Creek which has a rocky bottom, and that unavoidable noise that troops make in crossing a deep wading-stream of irregular depth.

Now the ambulances and artillery did the same thing in returning, and so did some of the Infantry; the other and greater part of the Infantry did not recross but kept along the bank. Humphreys pondered his good fortune to have survived this incident because he also recorded that.

I was right in not attempting it. The sons indeed Bream himself mentioned that I had not been gone ten minutes when a party of twenty or thirty of the enemy came up to the tavern and passed the night there. The chance of war; the day had been rainy and sultry, and the men longed for a few minutes more at each halt. Had I rode up to the Black Horse tavern fifteen minutes later, with my party of five or six, virtually unarmed, what might not have been the result of a deliberate volley from twenty or thirty muskets or rifles at a distance of twenty feet?

The division countermarched by recrossing Marsh Creek and marching along the road on the west bank of the creek.

1st New York Infantry

In moonlight Humphreys' brigades crossed to the east side of Marsh Creek at the Sachs covered bridge, forded Willoughby Run, passed Pitzer's Schoolhouse and proceeded up the gentle western slope of Seminary Ridge. As a precaution an infantry company was thrown out yards in advance of the division and the march proceeded along the Millerstown Road in his report Humphreys called this the Marsh Creek Road. The way was clear and at the intersection of the Emmitsburg Road at the Peach Orchard Union cavalry videttes were contacted.

Humphreys' fatigued division ended its very eventful approach march to Gettysburg and quickly went into bivouac at A. The Second Division commander and his staff were up and working at dawn on July 2. In his official report Humphreys stated that his "division was massed in the vicinity of its bivouac, facing the Emmitsburg road, near the crest of the ridge running from the Cemetery of Gettysburg, in a southerly direction, to a rugged, conical-shaped hill, which I find goes by the name of Round top, about 2 miles from Gettysburg.

Cavada led the relief regiment forward and recorded that "our picket line at that hour of the day was placed about one hundred yards beyond the Gettysburg and Emmetsburg road and following its course for about a mile southward.

Due to darkness, however, Burling did not begin his march to Gettysburg until A. Burling's route of march was straight up the Emmitsburg Road, but it took him five hours to cover the twelve miles. He arrived into Humphreys' bivouac position at A. Berdan's reconnaissance-in-force, Sickles became uncomfortable with the placement of his corps along Cemetery Ridge. In Sickles judgment, the high ground along the Emmitsburg Road was a better place to deploy his corps.

He had learned a painful lesson two months earlier at Chancellorsville when his corps was ordered to abandon the high ground of Hazel Grove, the loss of which spelled doom for the Army of Potomac that day. Accordingly, without obtaining the implicit permission of the army commander, Sickles began moving Birney's division to the left and forward to the Emmitsburg Road shortly after P.

By P. Never during his decision process for this movement did Sickles seek the technical advice of Humphreys, a premier topographical engineer. Perhaps Sickles isolated Humphreys from the decision process because regime weight watcher 18 points felt that Humphreys would have argued against creating a salient at the Peach Orchard and isolating the Third Corps from the rest of the army. At A. Sickles ordered Humphreys to send a regiment to the skirmish line along the Emmitsburg Road and Humphreys complied by sending the First Massachusetts of Carr's brigade to relieve the Fourth Maine of Ward's Brigade which immediately returned to its parent brigade.

Humphreys reports that. The line I was directed to occupy was near the foot of the westerly slope of the ridge Cemetery Ridge This second ridge declines again immediately west of the road, at the distance of or yards from which the edge of a wood runs parallel to it. This line would be Humphreys' first position of the day. Map 1 shows how Humphreys deployed Carr's Brigade in line of regiments as the first line, Brewster's Brigade in line of battalions yards in rear of the first line, and Burling's massed brigade as the third line yards in rear of the second line.

At the time this gap did not concern Humphreys because he considered this first position as a temporary deployment and, besides, he could plug the gap with troops from second and third line. Humphreys described the ground in front of this initial position as open, but he took steps to remove obstacles by having fences torn down.

Battery K, Fourth U. Furthermore, Humphreys ordered Colonel Brewster to strengthen the division skirmish line along the Emmitsburg Road in front of Carr's brigade. Brewster reports he was to hold the ground "at all hazards" and advanced the 73rd New York to positions around the Klingel house. Just as these dispositions were complete Humphreys received an order from Sickles that would profoundly affect his ability to hold the ground along his division's sector later that afternoon.

That order directed him to send Burling's Third Brigade to the First Division as a reserve to Birney's badly extended division. Cavada recorded in his diary that "Genl. Burling in rear of Birney's right and lead them to the place. I placed the Brigade in a rocky wood of large growth about a third of a mile to the left of the "big barn", a crumbling stone wall about 3 ft high serving as a cover. This done I returned to our Div. Burling's regiments would be committed into combat in a piecemeal fashion by Birney prompting the following comment in Burling's after action report: "my command being now all taken from me and separated, no two regiments being together, and being under the command of the different brigade commanders to whom they had reported, I, with my staff, reported to General Humphreys for instructions, remaining with him for some time.

In the hour preceding P. Things began to heat up at P. An irate General Meade decided to ride to the left and examine Sickles advanced line for himself. Before departing headquarters at the Leister House, Meade ordered Sykes' Fifth Corps, the army reserve corps, to begin moving to the endangered left flank.

Furthermore, as Meade and his staff entourage rode south along Cemetery Ridge on the way to an interview with Sickles near the Peach Orchard, he diverted his Topological Engineer, Brig. Gouverneur K. Warren liposuccion zaragoza precios the summit of Little Round Top to examine the situation there. Warren's timely action on Little Round Top made him a hero of the battle. At the Peach Orchard salient, Meade had a spirited conversation with Sickles just as Cure amaigrissement la baule urbanisme pre-infantry assault fire began to pour into the Third Corps positions.

After Meade explained to Sickles that the Peach Orchard position was neutral ground, Sickles asked if he should begin moving his troops back.

Humphreys' troop dispositions were complete. Humphreys' ADCs carried orders to the brigade commanders to begin a forward movement of about yards with Carr's brigade advancing in line and Brewster's Excelsior brigade advancing in battalions in mass. As the brigades began moving forward, Humphreys received an order from Major Ludlow of Meade's staff. Some reference was made at the time, also, I think, to the intended occupation of that ground by the Fifth Corps.

In a second, the Division went about face; retrod the ground, by the right flank, that they had the moment before gone over by the left flank; and, then, moved forward to their position along the Emmitsburg-road. The whole thing was done with the precision of a careful exercise; the enemy's artillery giving effect to its picturesqueness. The Division, Brigade, and Regimental flags were flying of course.

This divisional march and countermarch, so eloquently described by Humphreys, was the movement that the rest of the army perceived as the mass movement of the entire Third Corps to its advanced position at P.

Second Corps commander, Maj. Winfield S. Hancock, observing the spectacle of Humphreys' advance, was quick to recognize the danger of the move and quipped to his staff "wait a moment, you will soon see them tumbling back.

Humphreys advanced the division to its second position of the day in two lines see Map 2. Carr's brigade, the first line, was placed just behind the crest along which the Emmitsburg Road runs. The right of Carr's brigade line was held by the 26th Pennsylvania about yards south of the Codori barn and he extended his remaining regiments south along the Emmitsburg Road past the Klingel House.

S Artillery equipped with six, twelve pound smoothbore "Napoleons" to the right of the Rogers House. The response was for him to remain in place. Since Skin pigmentation gene mutation could not cover the entire division sector with only Carr's brigade, he extended his line by inserting Brewster's Second brigade regiments where needed. The 73rd New York was relieved by Carr's men at the Kingel House and formed to the left of the second line.

The 74th New York was sent to support the right of Carr's line and formed up behind the 26th Pennsylvania. The 70th and th New York regiments remained on the second line as division reserve. Between P. Humphreys heard the roar of musketry and cannon fire as Birney's division became decisively engaged with Hood's Division, the first echelon of Longstreet's Corps attack. During this time Humphreys says that the enemy made demonstrations to his front, but did not drive in his pickets.

He was probably observing McLaws' Division, Longstreet's second echelon, forming up prior to its attack at about P. About this time the 5th New Jersey, Colonel Sewell in command, of Burling's Brigade returned to Humphreys' control and he immediately sent it to replace the pickets in front of Graham's Brigade which overlapped the division left flank.

Within minutes of the deployment of the 5th New Jersey Humphreys received an urgent order from Sickles to reinforce Graham with a regiment.